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Securitization was a 
major source of credit 
to the economy, and 
its resurgence will 
likely contribute 
to our overall 
economic recovery.
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by Kenneth J. Robinson
securitization—the pooling and packaging of loans into securities for 
sale to investors—increases the availability and improves the terms of credit. 
rather than holding loans on their balance sheets, financial intermediaries can 
use the proceeds from securitization to originate new loans. Investors gain di-
versity from the pooling process and liquidity from the markets for asset-backed 
securities (aBs).
securitization grew rapidly for most of this decade, with aBs outstand-
ing rising from $3.4 trillion in first quarter 2000 to $8.4 trillion at their peak 
in mid-2008. at that time, aBs markets funded almost two-thirds of residen-
tial mortgages. Besides housing, aBs are an important part of providing credit 
for automobiles, credit card receivables and student loans. They also help fund 
small business loans. all told, these securities financed about a quarter of non-
mortgage consumer credit during the boom times. Given securitization’s impor-  EconomicLetter  Federal reserve Bank oF dallas 2   Federal reserve Bank oF dallas  EconomicLetter
Securitization markets 
were hit hard by the 
financial crisis. Net 
issuance fell off sharply. 
There were also sharp 
increases in the 
cost of credit.
tance, any major disruptions in activity 
could have a significant impact on the 
economy. 
In the financial crisis that began 
in August 2007, securitization activity 
virtually dried up. For years, ABS had 
become increasingly complex, with the 
rise of exotic securities like collateral-
ized debt obligations and securities 
issued by commercial paper conduits. 
Now frequently referred to as “toxic 
assets,” these securities proved much 
riskier and more difficult to value than 
issuers or investors originally assumed.
When the housing bubble burst, 
the value of the collateral backing 
much of the ABS declined sharply, 
and so did the value of the securities 
themselves. Not surprisingly, inves-
tors shunned ABS, and this important 
source of credit grew scarce.
The Federal Reserve responded by 
creating the term asset-backed securi-
ties loan facility, or TALF. Its purpose 
is to boost securitization by providing 
loans to people holding certain highly 
rated ABS. These loans will then sup-
port new ABS issues and help thaw 
out the securitization markets. Judging 
from both new issues and spreads in 
secondary markets, the TALF appears 
to be meeting its objective of jump-
starting the securitization markets.
Crisis and Response
The financial crisis started in the 
summer of 2007 with the collapse 
of two Bear Stearns-managed hedge 
funds engaged in highly leveraged 
subprime mortgage ABS investments. 
The failure set off a chain of events 
that spread beyond ABS associated 
with mortgages.1 
Net issuance of ABS fell off sharp-
ly (Chart 1). In fact, the private-label 
market virtually shut down in 2008. 
Traditional investors shunned ABS and 
exhibited a flight to quality by turning 
to safer U.S. government securities. 
Treasury yields edged close to zero. 
There were also sharp increases 
in the cost of credit. Spreads soared to 
unprecedented levels, even on highly 
rated tranches of ABS—a reflection of 
unusually high risk premiums (Chart 
2). As the financial crisis deepened, 
the Fed responded in traditional ways, 
lowering the federal funds rate and 
increasing discount window lending. 
Interest payments on reserves, sched-
uled for 2011, were pushed forward. 
When it became clear these con-
ventional responses wouldn’t stem the 
crisis, the Fed turned to a new set of 
policy tools to provide liquidity and 
direct funding to borrowers and inves-
tors in key credit markets. The result 
was a veritable alphabet soup of new 
facilities: TAF, TSLF, PDCF, AMLF, 
CPFF, MMIFF.2 To address securitiza-
tion markets’ problems, the Fed cre-
ated the TALF in November 2008.
In its announcement, the Fed 
said the facility “will help market 
participants meet the credit needs of 
households and small businesses by 
supporting the issuance of ABS collat-
eralized by student loans, auto loans, 
credit card loans, and loans guaranteed 
by the Small Business Administration 
(SBA).”3 A number of modifications 
and expansions have been implement-
ed, increasing the TALF’s potential size 
and widening the types of collateral 
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The possible increase 
to $1 trillion makes 
the TALF potentially 
one of the Fed’s 
largest programs.
borrowers can use (see the box titled 
“TALF Chronology” on p. 7).
The TALF has characteristics that 
set it apart. Unlike the other facilities, 
the TALF isn’t solely for provision of 
liquidity. Instead, it will provide inves-
tors with term loans of up to five years 
against highly rated securities. And, 
unlike other lending programs, the 
TALF combines Fed liquidity with capi-
tal provided by the Treasury. Finally, 
the possible increase to $1 trillion 
makes the TALF potentially one of the 
Fed’s largest programs.
The initial program authorized the 
New York Fed to lend up to $200 bil-
lion to holders of certain highly rated 
ABS backed by newly and recently 
originated consumer and small busi-
ness loans. These would be nonre-
course loans, which limit borrowers’ 
potential losses to the initial amount of 
ABS put up as collateral. 
Granting nonrecourse loans cre-
ated the need for an entity—called a 
special purpose vehicle (SPV)—to pur-
chase and manage any assets received 
from the TALF loans in the event of a 
default. Financing for the SPV comes 
initially from the Treasury’s Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP), which 
will purchase $20 billion in subordi-
nated debt from the SPV.
If this proves insufficient, the New 
York Fed will lend to the SPV. This 
loan will be senior to the TARP. Cash 
flows from SPV assets will first pay 
off the loan from the New York Fed, 
with proceeds then going to the TARP.
Furthermore, the New York Fed grants 
recourse loans to the SPV, allow-
ing it to recoup losses beyond initial 
collateral.
Any U.S. company that owns ABS-
eligible collateral may borrow from 
the TALF. The companies pay a small 
administrative fee of 10 to 20 basis 
points (0.1 to 0.2 percentage points), 
depending on the type of collateral. 
Borrowers are offered a floating-rate or 
fixed-rate loan, also depending on the 
collateral.
Interest rates vary with the col-
lateral securing the loan, but the Fed 
stipulated that they should be “set 
with a view to providing borrowers an 
incentive to purchase eligible ABS at 
yield spreads higher than in more nor-
mal market conditions but lower than 
in the highly illiquid market conditions 
that have prevailed during the recent 
credit market turmoil.”4
The TALF is structured to mini-
mize the Fed’s risk. With the exception 
of securities fully guaranteed by the 
SBA, TALF-eligible ABS must have the 
highest investment-grade rating from 
two or more nationally recognized 
rating agencies. In addition, the secu-
rity must not have been rated below 
investment grade or placed on watch 
for a downgrade.
So-called haircuts will be applied 
across asset types. These haircuts 
represent the difference between the 
ABS’s value and the dollar amount of 
the loan extended. The minimum size 
of a TALF loan is $10 million, and hair-
cuts vary with the type of collateral. 
Initially, eligible collateral includ-
ed ABS backed by recently issued 
automobile, credit card and student 
loans, plus SBA-guaranteed small busi-
Chart 2
ABS Spreads Soar During Crisis
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ness loans. The criteria for “recently 
issued” vary. For example, substantially 
all the credit exposures underlying 
eligible auto loan ABS must have been 
originated on or after Oct. 1, 2007. The 
eligible ABS themselves must be issued 
on or after Jan. 1, 2009.
The Fed significantly increased the 
TALF’s scope in May 2009, announc-
ing the eligibility of highly rated com-
mercial mortgage-backed securities 
(CMBS). CMBS outstanding increased 
steadily throughout the past decade, 
rising from $200 billion in early 2000 
to a peak of almost $800 billion at the 
end of 2007. Since then, the market 
has faltered, with net issues turning 
negative in 2008 (Chart 3).
Including CMBS as eligible col-
lateral should help strengthen the 
commercial property market. Easing 
the credit crunch in this market, the 
Fed said, “will help prevent defaults 
on economically viable commercial 
properties, increase the capacity of 
current holders of maturing mortgages 
to make additional loans, and facili-
tate the sale of distressed properties.”5 
Successful refinancing of commercial 
mortgage loans maturing over the next 
few years will likely be greatly assisted 
by a revived CMBS market.  
TALF operations are conducted 
monthly with separate operations 
for ABS and CMBS. March and April 
elicited interest from ABS backed by 
autos and credit cards (Chart 4). May 
and June showed an increase in the 
amount of loans requested as well as 
expansion in the types of collateral that 
investors offered. The July operations 
resulted in a little more than $6 billion 
in loan requests; August operations 
received $9.2 billion in loan requests.
The TALF had been slated to 
end on Dec. 31, 2009, but the Fed 
has extended it until June 30, 2010, 
depending on the collateral offered.
Securitization Markets Respond
Like other Fed actions in the 
financial crisis, the TALF fits with the 
central bank’s broad macroeconomic 
goals. Reviving securitization markets 
Chart 3
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will help lenders meet the credit needs 
of consumers and small businesses, 
providing stimulus to the overall econ-
omy. New securitization activity and 
interest rates on securities tell us how 
financial markets are responding.
The first signs of a comeback 
began even before the first TALF 
operation in March. Student loan 
ABS, which had disappeared in late 
2008, reappeared in February (Chart 
5). Credit card ABS, also dormant for 
months, followed in March. As TALF 
operations got under way, all markets 
showed signs of recovery—with the 
exception of CMBS. It continued to 
exhibit weakness until June—most 
likely reflecting the fact that the TALF’s 
first CMBS operation didn’t occur until 
the middle of that month.6
During the crisis, interest rate 
spreads on ABS reached unprecedent-
ed levels as investors demanded higher 
and higher risk premiums. Among 
the highly rated ABS initially targeted 
by the TALF—credit card, auto and 
student loans—the secondary mar-
ket yield spreads were elevated even 
before the sharp increases beginning 
in fall 2008. By the time the TALF was 
announced, spreads had increased to 
between 400 and 700 basis points (or 
4 to 7 percentage points). 
Soon after the Fed addressed 
these difficulties, spreads peaked, and 
they’ve been on a fairly sustained 
downward trend since (Chart 6). By 
contrast, the spread on highly rated 
home equity loan ABS continued to 
widen even after the TALF’s announce-
ment. Securitized home equity loans 
aren’t eligible for the TALF, providing 
some indication of the positive impact 
on securitization markets for TALF-
eligible ABS.  
The early February announcement 
that the TALF could increase to as 
much as $1 trillion was accompanied 
by the continued downward trend 
in risk spreads for assets that are the 
focus of the TALF’s operations. The 
lack of a similar response for home 
equity ABS affirms that the TALF played 
a role in improving the prospects for 
Chart 5
After TALF, ABS Markets Stage a Comeback
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securitization markets.
What happened after CMBS 
became TALF-eligible? The Fed facility 
focuses only on the highly rated seg-
ment of the market, so it’s not surpris-
ing that the response differs between 
AAA-rated CMBS and lower-rated BBB 
CMBS. The spread on highly rated 
CMBS peaked immediately before the 
TALF announcement in November 
2008 (Chart 7). Although the CMBS 
market wasn’t initially part of the 
TALF, investors most likely viewed the 
Fed’s support as positive for securitiza-
tion markets in general.  
The possibility of a larger TALF 
including newly issued CMBS also 
seemed to exert a positive effect. Soon 
after the February announcement, the 
risk spread on AAA-rated CMBS began 
a fairly steady decline. The spread on 
lower-rated CMBS showed little or no 
improvement. Lower-rated CMBS aren’t 
TALF-eligible, so the CMBS market’s 
riskier segment hasn’t seemed to ben-
efit from the potential increase in the 
TALF’s size.
Finally, comparing relative move-
ments in spreads also points to the 
TALF’s potentially positive influence. 
The TALF only accepts highly rated 
ABS, and this segment has seen the 
largest relative declines in risk spreads 
(Chart 8). Consistent with earlier results, 
CMBS markets have shown the least 
relative improvement in spreads so far.7  
On the Road to Recovery
The importance of the securitiza-
tion markets and the TALF’s potential 
size make it one of the most signifi-
cant Fed policy actions undertaken in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
Securitization was a major source of 
credit to the economy, and its resur-
gence will likely contribute to our 
overall economic recovery. 
Initial findings suggest ABS mar-
kets are in the early stages of a recov-
ery. Some investors are re-entering the 
markets with new issues. While still 
high by historical norms, risk spreads 
have shown a sustained decline over 
the past few months. However, impor-
Chart 7
Spreads on Highly Rated CMBS Decline
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Spreads Decline Faster for Highly Rated ABS
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tant changes may be in store for these 
markets as their recovery continues. 
Securitization isn’t likely to grow as 
rapidly as it did earlier in the decade, 
largely because of restructurings at 
hedge funds and other nonbank 
lenders, which had fueled much of 
the expansion in securitized assets. 
TALF Chronology
Nov. 25, 2008 Fed announces the creation of the term asset-backed securi-
ties loan facility (TALF) under the Federal Reserve Act’s Section 
13(3), a Depression-era provision that allows the central bank 
broad powers to make loans in difficult economic times.
Dec. 19, 2008 TALF loan maturities are increased from one to three years. TALF 
loans will be distributed to all eligible borrowers rather than 
through an auction process.
Feb. 10, 2009 The Fed announces its willingness to expand the TALF to as 
much as $1 trillion. Eligible collateral could be broadened to 
include highly rated commercial-mortgage-backed securities 
(CMBS) and private-label asset-backed securities (ABS) backed 
by residential mortgages.
March 3, 2009 Fed puts the TALF into operation, with subscriptions accepted 
beginning March 17.
March 19, 2009 Fed expands the eligible collateral to include ABS backed by 
loans or leases related to business equipment, vehicle fleet 
leases, floorplan loans and mortgage servicing advances.
March 23, 2009 Fed and Treasury expand eligible collateral to include legacy 
securities to complement the Treasury’s Public–Private Invest-
ment Program.
May 1, 2009 Fed announces that newly issued CMBS and securities backed 
by insurance premium finance loans would be eligible collateral, 
beginning in June. TALF loans with maturities of five years are 
also authorized.
May 19, 2009 Fed announces that certain high-quality CMBS issued before Jan. 
1, 2009, (legacy CMBS) would become eligible collateral begin-
ning in July.
Aug. 17, 2009 Fed and Treasury announce that the TALF is extended through 
March 31, 2010, for loans against newly issued ABS and legacy 
CMBS. TALF lending against newly issued CMBS is extended 
through June 30, 2010.
Securitization isn’t 
 likely to grow as rapidly 
 as it did earlier in the 
decade, largely because 
of restructurings at hedge 
funds and other nonbank 
lenders.
Investors may have lost their taste 
for the complex and difficult-to-value 
products that grew explosively early 
in this decade. The TALF itself could 
lead to an unintended credit allocation 
by favoring certain types of ABS—the 
highly rated segment—over other 
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Federal regulatory proposals that 
would require originators to keep a 
certain percentage of any credit risk 
on the assets they’re securitizing could 
also dampen the size of such activity. 
Changes to accounting standards will 
also likely impact securitization. These 
new standards will require a greater 
amount of disclosure about securiti-
zation transactions and companies’ 
continuing exposure to risks related 
to the transfer of assets. In particular, 
accounting for off-balance-sheet enti-
ties set up by banks will become sub-
ject to enhanced guidance.8 
These changes point to an ABS 
marketplace that may be less dynamic 
but more stable than earlier in the 
decade. Even a smaller, more homoge-
nized securitization sector is important 
for reviving lending for both consum-
ers and small businesses and for con-
tributing to an economic recovery.
Robinson is a research officer in the Financial 
Industry Studies Department of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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in Chart 4.
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